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Fisch et al. report in this issue of Neuron the results of an investigation of the neural correlates of conscious
perception. They find an early, dramatic, and long-lasting gamma response in high-level visual areas, when
(and only when) a rapidly presented image is perceived.Subjective feelings and percepts emerge
from the activity of neuronal circuits in the
brain. While most would agree with this
statement, much less agreement can be
reached regarding the mechanisms
responsible for subjective sensations. The
‘‘where,’’ ‘‘when,’’ and particularly ‘‘how’’
of the so-called neuronal correlates of
consciousness constitute an area of active
research and passionate debate (Koch,
2005). Historically, many neuroscientists
avoided research in this field as a topic
too complex or too far removed from
what we understood to be worth a serious
investment of time and effort. In recent
years, however, this has begun to change:
while we are still very far from a solution,
systematic and rigorous approaches
guided by neuroscience knowledge are
making progress toward understanding
these most complex cognitive functions.
In this issue, Fisch et al. (2009) report
exciting results pertaining to the locus
and timing of neural activity that may give
rise to a conscious visual percept.
Due to practical reasons, the underpin-
nings of subjective perception have been
particularly (but not exclusively) studied in
the domain of vision. There have been
several heroic efforts to study the neuronal
correlates of visual perception using animal
models (e.g., Leopold and Logothetis,
1999; Macknik, 2006, among many others).
A prevalent experimental paradigm in-
volves dissociating the visual input from
perception. For example, in multistable
percepts (such as the well-known Necker
cube illusion), the same input can lead to
two different percepts. Under these condi-
tions, investigators ask which neuronal
events correlate with the alternating
subjective percepts. It has become clear
that the firing of neurons in many parts of446 Neuron 64, November 25, 2009 ª2009the brain may not be correlated with
perception. In a perhaps trivial example,
activity in the retina is essential for seeing,
but the perceptual experience does not
arise until several synapses later, when
activity reaches higher stages within visual
cortex. Several neurophysiological studies
suggest that there is an increase in the
degree of correlation between neuronal
activity and visual awareness at progres-
sively higher levels of ventral visual cortex
(Leopold and Logothetis, 1999; Macknik,
2006). Neurophysiological, neuroanatom-
ical, and theoretical considerations suggest
that subjective perception correlates with
activity occurringafter primary visual cortex
(Koch, 2005; Leopold and Logothetis,
1999; Macknik, 2006). Investigators have
similarly suggested an upper bound on
the circuits involved in subjective percep-
tion. Lesions in the hippocampus and
frontal cortex (which are thought to underlie
memory and association) yield severe
cognitive impairments, but these lesions
seem to leave many aspects of visual
perception largely intact. Thus, the neuro-
physiological and lesion studies seem to
constrain the problem to the multiple
stages involved in processing visual infor-
mation along the ventral visual cortex.
To interrogate theneuralcircuits involved
invisualperception,Fischetal.usedatech-
nique called backward masking. Masking
has been used to control the visibility of
stimuli in behavioral studies since the early
20th century. The basic idea is that when
two images are shown in rapid succession,
one of the images may influence percep-
tion of the other image. In the case of back-
ward masking, a mask is presented shortly
after the stimulus under study. Depending
on the nature of the mask and, in particular,
on the time interval between stimulus andElsevier Inc.mask, perception of the first stimulus may
be severely impaired or even completely
eliminated. The possibility of controlling
perceptual visibility has interested several
neurophysiologists in examining the neu-
ronal responses during masking (for a
review, see Macknik, 2006). Single-unit
recordings in monkey inferotemporal
cortex (IT) have shown that masked stimuli
that are not perceived can still drive selec-
tive responses in high-level visual areas,
though the duration and amount of infor-
mation carried are both decreased (Kova´cs
et al., 1995; Rolls et al., 1999).
It is possible to study neurophysiological
activity at high spatiotemporal resolution in
animal models, but it is not always easy to
access the subjective state of the animals.
While the subjective state of humans is
comparatively easier to evaluate, current
noninvasive tools offer poor spatial and/or
temporal resolution. Patients who have
electrodes implanted for clinical reasons
offer a rare opportunity to study physiolog-
icalactivity in thehumanbrainathighspatial
and temporal resolution (Engel et al., 2005;
Kreiman, 2007). Depth electrodes, as well
as subdural grid and strip electrodes, are
routinely implanted in patients with intrac-
table epilepsy in preparation for surgical
resection of epileptic foci. Neurophysiolog-
ical recordings in awake patients offer
a window of opportunity to localize and
characterize the dynamics of the neural
activity underlying cognitive events at milli-
second resolution, the relevant timescale
involved in visual perception.
The high temporal resolution of these
recordings enables investigators to interro-
gate the different temporal rhythms
observed in brain activity, some of which
have been associated with cognitive
processing. These rhythms were first noted
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since been observed using a variety of
electrophysiological techniques. One such
example is the power in the gamma band
of the frequency spectrum (typically defined
as a band around 40 Hz). Several neuro-
physiological reports have observed
gamma rhythms that are modulated by
attentional demands and cognitive tasks
(e.g., Womelsdorf et al., 2006, among
many others). Modulation in the gamma
band of the spectrum has also been
observed in recordings in epilepsy patients
with implanted electrodes. For example,
increases in gamma power over wide-
spread regions of cortex were observed
when patients performed a task in which
they had to identify masked and unmasked
words (Gaillard et al., 2009). These in-
creases vanished quickly for masked
words, but persisted for several hundred
milliseconds when words were unmasked
and therefore identifiable.
In this issue of Neuron, Fisch et al. used
a backward masking paradigm to inquire
about the timing, location, and nature of
neural responses correlated with conscious
perception. They presented subjects im-
planted with subdural electrodes with
images of faces, houses, and man-made
objects, followed by a mask. Subjects
were asked to identify verbally which of
those three categories described the image
or to indicate that they could not tell. The
delay between the image and the mask
was in most trials set at a point where the
subject’s correct categorization perfor-
mance was close to 50%. Under these
conditions, Fisch et al. were able to
compare neural responses to stimuli that
were in every way very similar but gave
rise to very different conscious perceptual
experiences. As reported in other studies,
they found many visually responsive elec-
trodes over visual cortex (McCarthy et al.,
1999;Liuetal., 2009). Inaddition tochanges
in the overall power of the response, they
observed that these electrodes recorded
significant increases in gamma power
(defined in this study as the band between
30 and 70 Hz) within 250 ms of stimulus
onset. They restricted the bulk of their anal-
yses to electrodes that showed significantly
higher gamma power in response to at least
one of the three stimulus categories as
compared with the response to control trials
in which only a mask was shown. This
allowed them to focus on the visualresponses to the experimental stimuli rather
than responses to the masks. All of these
category-selective electrodes were located
over brain regions known to be important
for high-level vision.
The key comparison in terms of
correlating the neural responses with
subjective perception involved comparing
trials with the same stimulus category but
different recognition performance—that is,
comparing those trials that yielded recogni-
tion versus those trials that failed to elicit
recognition.While the stimuli werenot iden-
tical in these two conditions, the category-
selective electrodes tended to show similar
responses to the different exemplars of
a given category. The majority of target-
selective electrodes showed increases in
gamma power in recognized trials when
compared with unrecognized trials. Inter-
estingly, these differences started early:
they were detected in the population anal-
ysis as early as 90 ms after stimulus onset.
This rapid onset is as fast as the earliest
visually selective responses in macaque
IT neurons (e.g., Logothetis and Sheinberg,
1996) or human temporal lobe recordings
(Liu et al., 2009). The increase in gamma
power in recognized versus unrecognized
trials lasted several hundred milliseconds.
Fisch et al. describe these results as
consistent with a model in which visual
input leads to reverberatory activity in
higher-level visual areas. This reverbera-
tory activity ‘‘ignites’’ after a short buildup
into a prolonged period of strong neural
activation, giving rise to the observed
increase in gamma power. The authors
propose that this change in gamma band
power could underlie conscious visual
perception. A mask shortly after stimulus
presentation could interrupt that reverber-
atory process and prevent ignition, and
thus perception. In those trials where the
mask failed to interrupt the information
flow, areas downstream from these late
visual areas would receive the message
of what was seen, then process and inter-
pret those messages—perhaps giving rise
to the late gamma activity noted in many
brain regions by Gaillard et al. (2009) in
their masked word-recognition task.
This study highlights a variety of impor-
tant questions. What are the neuronal
circuits, neuronal cell types, and mecha-
nisms underlying these gamma oscilla-
tions? What are the minimal conditions
that are necessary and sufficient to triggerNeuron 64,the type of reverberatory activity described
in this study? Are the observed gamma
oscillations necessary for perception? To
examine further the role of gamma band
frequencies, it would be of interest to
disrupt the gamma activity patterns
(without affecting the rest of the network,
to the extent that this is possible). Exciting
new developments using a combination of
high-resolution imaging, electrophysi-
ology, and molecular biology promise to
make progress in this direction (Cardin
et al., 2009; Han et al., 2009). The elegant
work of Fisch et al. provides concrete
and testable hypotheses about the spatial
and temporal location of neural events
involved in perception. As our knowledge
and our tool sets grow, we grow ever
closer to a basic understanding of the
nature of subjective human experience.
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